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Corruption has been shown to discourage entrepreneurship in both developed and developing 
countries. However, it is less clear to what extent corruption affects the development of institutions’ 
impact on entrepreneurial activity in the context of emerging economies, such as those in the post-
communist countries. This study used Institutional Economics as a conceptual framework to analyse 
the moderating effect of control of corruption (informal institution) on the relationship between formal 
institutions (such as the number of procedures, education and training, access to finance, and 
technology absorption) and entrepreneurial activity. The study used panel data of 14 post-communist 
countries and different secondary databases from the years 2006-2016. The article has several 
implications from both theoretical perspectives (advancing the application of Institutional Economics 
for the study of entrepreneurship) and from the practical point of view (providing insights for 
governmental policies interested in fostering higher levels of entrepreneurial activity). 
 





Entrepreneurship has been recognised as a driving force for sustainable economic growth in 
recent years (Acs and Szerb, 2010; Acs et al., 2014b). However, the above relationship is contingent 
upon the level of institutional development in a given country (Acs et al., 2014a). As argued by Baumol 
(1990), where institutions are effective, entrepreneurs are more likely to focus their energies towards 
productive activities and undertake new ventures. While scholars have analysed the relationship 
between formal institutions (laws and regulations) and entrepreneurship, the relationship between 
informal institutions (social norms and culture) and entrepreneurship remains understudied (Carlos et 
al., 2013; Castaño-Martínez et al., 2015; Fuentelsaz et al., 2015; Bjørnskov and Foss, 2016; Ghura et 
al, 2017). Moreover, despite the constant interactions between formal and informal institutions, the 
literature lacks consensus regarding such interactions and their impact on entrepreneurship 
(Williamson, 2000; Ghura et al., 2017; Mohamadi et al., 2017). 
Little is known about entrepreneurship dynamics in emerging economies: “economies that are 
increasingly moving to market orientation and seeking to rapidly advance economically” (Bruton et al., 
2008, p. 1). While emerging economies are different from developed economies in that they lack well-
developed institutions, often resulting in lower entrepreneurial activity (Ahlstrom et al., 2008; Bruton 
et al., 2008; Bruton et al., 2009), some post-communist emerging economies such as Estonia, Slovenia, 
and Slovakia have managed to close this gap and appear in the top 30 of the Global Entrepreneurship 
Index (Acs et al., 2014b). Shedding light on the varying degree in which post-communist countries have 
achieved entrepreneurship development, it is, therefore, imperative to understand the role of institutions 
and their interaction (formal and informal) that have resulted in better performing entrepreneurial 
environment in the above countries. This is of particular importance as while reforming formal 
institutions (e.g., government regulations and education) is integral to the overall institutional 
effectiveness, such improvements do not necessarily guarantee increased entrepreneurial activity 
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(Bruton et al., 2013). This phenomenon is further evident in the case of former communist economies; 
where on the surface, they have laws and regulations similar to those seen in developed economies. 
However, commercial laws that affect entrepreneurship are not efficiently implemented, and thus these 
institutions are not conducive to foster entrepreneurial activity (Feige, 1997; Smallbone and Welter, 
2001; Aidis et al., 2008; Tonoyan et al., 2011; Smallbone et al., 2014). 
Moreover, quintessential to the post-communist countries are high levels of corruption as the 
lingering legacy of the previous centrally planned economic systems (Smallbone and Welter, 2001; 
Tonoyan et al., 2010). Therefore, these countries can offer a useful context for a comprehensive 
theoretical understanding of the role of institutions (formal and informal) on entrepreneurship, and 
whether the improved institutional environment has helped the countries mentioned above increase their 
level of entrepreneurial activity (Bruton et al., 2008; Bruton et al., 2009). Moreover, due to the 
prevalence of corruption in these countries’ institutions, there is a need to test corruption as a moderator 
in order to have a better understanding of institutional dynamics as most previous studies have treated 
corruption merely as a control variable (Bruton et al., 2008; Bruton et al., 2013; Pathak et al., 2015).  
As a result, this study aims to examine the impact of informal institutions such as control of 
corruption on the relationship between formal institutions and entrepreneurial activity in the context of 
post-communist countries. Also, still missing from the literature is a large longitudinal panel study of 
country-level rates of entrepreneurship. Such panel data analysis is worth pursuing to enhance the 
validity of the research while considering sufficient controls to account for institutional differences in 
the context of post-communist economies (Bruton et al., 2008; Levie and Autio, 2011).  
This paper proceeds as follows. First, we theorise about the effects of formal institutions, 
corruption and their interactions on entrepreneurship. Second, we describe our sample data and 
methodology. Third, we discuss and present the statistical results, and finally, the conclusions and future 
research are presented. 
 
2. FRAMEWORK AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
Recent studies have attempted to explain different determinants of overall entrepreneurial 
activity categories such as economic (GDP, unemployment), institutional and governmental 
(corruption, barriers of entrepreneurship), R&D and innovation, cultural and socioeconomic, among 
others (Roman et al., 2017; Dvouletý, 2017). In this study, however, we focus on the determinants of 
entrepreneurial activity from the institutional perspective based on the study’s context, as numerous 
studies have shown that entrepreneurial activity rates are contingent upon the levels of institutional 
developments in emerging economies (Acs et al., 2014a; Apparicio et al. 2016; Urbano et al., 2018). 
The pioneering work of Douglass North (1990, 2005) and Baumol (1990) remains crucial to 
our understanding of the central role institutions play in entrepreneurship development. In this 
perspective, entrepreneurs, who set up organisations, adapt their activities and strategies in response to 
the market opportunities and limitations provided by the formal and informal institutions (Gnyawali 
and Fogel, 1994; Manolova et al., 2008). Institutions can be defined in this context as the “rules of the 
game in a society, or more formally, the constraints that shape human interaction” (North, 1990, p. 3). 
While formal institutions exist to decrease transaction, costs caused by laws and regulations, informal 
institutions intend to reduce uncertainties involved in human interaction (North, 2005). Therefore, as 
argued by North (1990), informal institutions that are culturally derived may constrain the changes and 
the improvements of formal institutions and vice versa.  
In line with the seminal work of North (1990, 2005), Gnyawali and Fogel (1994) suggested an 
institutional framework inclusive of five dimensions of the entrepreneurial environment: government 
policies and procedures, social and economic factors, entrepreneurial and business skills, and financial 
and non-financial assistance to businesses. Moreover, recent empirical studies found Gnyawali and 
Fogel’s (1994) framework conducive in examining the impact of institutional dimensions on 
entrepreneurial activity (Álvarez and Urbano, 2011; Fuentelsaz et al., 2015; Aparicio et al., 2016). Thus, 
this study is closely guided by Gnyawali and Fogel’s (1994) entrepreneurial (i.e., institutional) 
framework and following North’s (1990, 2005) propositions on institutional dynamics. In this respect, 
government procedures (PRO), education and training (TEDU), access to credit (AC) and technology 
absorption (TA) are considered as formal institutions, whereas control of corruption (CC) is considered 
as an informal institution in this study. Our choice in selecting these formal institutions is informed by 
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considerable evidence that these institutions are essential influencers of entrepreneurial activity 
(Álvarez and Urbano, 2011; Stenholm et al., 2013; Aparicio et al., 2016). Moreover, in accordance to 
the model, economic conditions, related to the economic growth of a specific country is included as a 
control variable in our study (Álvarez and Urbano, 2011; Álvarez et al., 2014). 
Since the direct effect of formal institutions that are considered in this study as well as country-
level control of corruption, have been empirically established in the existing literature: number of 
procedures (Urbano and Alvarez, 2014; Castaño-Martínez et al., 2015; Chowdhury et al., 2015; 
Fuentelsaz et al., 2015; Aparicio et al., 2016), Access to credit (Castaño-Martínez et al., 2015; 
Fuentelsaz et al., 2015; Aparicio et al., 2016), education and training (Castaño-Martínez et al., 2015; 
Chowdhury et al., 2015; Fuentelsaz et al., 2015; Aparicio et al., 2016), Technology absorption 
(Stenholm et al., 2013; Acs et al., 2014b), and corruption (El Harbi and Anderson, 2010; Aidis et al., 
2012; Estrin et al., 2013; Chowdhury et al., 2015 ), we refrained from engaging in a lengthy review of 
those effects. Therefore, our conceptual framework is designed to analyse the moderating effects of 
control of corruption on the relationship between formal institutions and entrepreneurial activity, as 
shown in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1: The developed conceptual framework of this study 
 
2.1 Control of Corruption and Entrepreneurship  
 
Although entrepreneurial activity is influenced by various informal institutions such as social 
networks (De Clercq et al., 2010; Estrin et al., 2013; Stenhom et al., 2013), cultural values (Hayton and 
Cacciotti, 2013; Fernández-Serrano and Liñán, 2014; Fernández-Serrano and Romero, 2014; 
Sambharya and Musteen, 2014; Brancu et al., 2015), role models (Álvarez and Urbano, 2011), media 
attention (Stenholm et al., 2013), and social recognition (Stenholm et al., 2013; Urbano and Alvarez, 
2014; Castaño-Martínez et al., 2015; Castaño et al., 2015, corruption has received very little attention. 
Corruption as an informal institution is purportedly among the most critical negative indicators that can 
potentially influence entrepreneurial activity through interaction with other formal institutions 
(Anokhin and Schulze, 2009; Mohamadi et al., 2017; Liu et al., 2019). Scholars define corruption in 
the context of informal abuse of public assets for private gains that impacts resource allocation (Aidis 
et al., 2012; Payne et al., 2013; Chowdhury et al., 2015). In other words, corruption reflects the 
multidimensional impact of weak institutions in a given country (Tanzi, 1998; Payne et al., 2013).  
When corruption is widespread, it becomes embedded in the culture and is thus formed into a social 
norm of behaviour. Consequently, even if the change is introduced to formal institutional processes, 
corruption can potentially slow down the desired reforms outcomes (North, 1990; Williamson, 2000; 
Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006). 
It is noteworthy, however, that the current literature is discrepant when it comes to ascribing 
the role of corruption on entrepreneurial activity and economic growth (Dreher and Gassebner, 2013; 
Dutta and Sobel, 2016; Mohamadi et al., 2017; Liu et al., 2019). On the one hand, according to grease 
the wheel theory, corruption is suggested to help entrepreneurship by shortening the start-up process 
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for aspiring entrepreneurs (Aidit, 2009, Dutta and Sobel, 2016). On the other hand, a larger body of 
research posited that corruption has a negative overall impact on economic development in the long 
run, due continuous rent-seeking from entrepreneurs by corrupt officials (Aidit, 2009; Anokhin and 
Schulze, 2009; Aidis et al., 2012; Avnimelech et al., 2014; Aparicio et al., 2016; Dutta and Sobel, 2016; 
Dvouletý and Blažková, 2018).  
Therefore, in light of the current discrepancy, the hypotheses formed in this study aim to expand 
the understanding of the indirect effect of corruption as a moderator between formal institutions and 
entrepreneurial activity (Pathak et al. 2015). Following assertions of the signalling theory (Spence, 
1973, 1974), formal institutions (e.g., business regulations) are likely to have a better impact on 
entrepreneurial activity in a corruption-free environment (Levie and Autio, 2011). Thus, this study 
proposes that control of corruption may have a moderating effect on the relationship between formal 
institutions (i.e., the number of business procedures, education and training, access to credit and firm-
level technology absorption) and entrepreneurial activity in the context of post-communist countries 
(Payne et al., 2013).   
 
2.2 Control of Corruption and Number of Procedures for Entrepreneurship 
 
Gnyawali and Fogel (1994) suggested that governmental regulations such as the number of 
procedures, costs and taxes, among other factors, that are associated with starting a business have a 
negative connotation for potential entrepreneurs. For example, entrepreneurs in Australia spend two 
days to start-up a new venture while in Brazil it may take up to 152 days to establish a venture due to 
stringent regulations and extended length of time to acquire necessary permits and licenses (Klapper et 
al. 2006). Hence, these extensive business procedures may distract entrepreneurs from investing their 
resources in “productive” activities (Baumol 1990; Chowdhury et al., 2015).  
Various studies have empirically posited the adverse effect of the number of procedures on 
entrepreneurial activity levels (Urbano and Alvarez, 2014; Castaño-Martínez et al., 2015; Chowdhury 
et al., 2015; Fuentelsaz et al., 2015; Aparacio et al., 2016). In line with the abovementioned empirical 
evidence, the Doing Business project at the World Bank advocates for regulation reduction, suggesting 
that simpler procedures further stimulate entrepreneurs to start new ventures. For example, “simplifying 
the formalities of registration was the most popular reform during the years 2007 and 2008, 
implemented in 49 countries” (Álvarez and Urbano, 2011, p. 35). 
The above observations about the impact of procedures on entrepreneurship are particularly crucial in 
the context of emerging economies; since aspiring entrepreneurs in such economies must tackle issues 
such as volatile or ineffective regulations (Aidis et al., 2008). This argument is further applicable in the 
context of post-communist countries, which are characterised by higher levels of corruption (Smallbone 
and Welter, 2001; Tonoyan et al., 2010). 
In this realm, Klapper and Love (2010) found that reforms in regards to reducing the number of 
procedures are more effective in countries with a better business environment. Conversely, he 
contended that reforms into procedures need much work in countries with fewer advantages business 
environment. In accordance to Klapper and Love’s (2010) findings, control of corruption is one factor 
that could be beneficial to the society in terms of promoting greater trust in government reform policies 
and as such encourage aspiring entrepreneurs to formally register their ventures (Aparicio et al., 2016). 
This argument is further supported by Naudé (2008) who suggested that reducing corruption levels in 
the context of developing countries will ultimately lead to better and more efficient entry procedures 
and thus, allow for increased market entry of new ventures. To this end, this study hypothesises: 
 
H1: Control of corruption moderates the negative relationship between the number of procedures 
and entrepreneurial activity such that the stronger the control of corruption, the stronger this 
relationship.  
 
2.3 Control of Corruption, Education and Training for Entrepreneurship 
 
Entrepreneurship education and training have been widely recognised to enhance 
entrepreneurial activity levels (Gnyawali and Fogel, 1994; Levie and Autio, 2008; Fuentelsaz et al., 
2015). In particular, a tertiary educational system that focuses on developing skills and competencies 
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in the areas of market analysis, product and service development, and business and financial literacy, 
enables entrepreneurs to establish and manage high growth ventures (Bowen and De Clercq, 2008; 
Danis and De Clercq, 2011; Jiménez et al., 2015). Therefore, an educational system with the focus on 
entrepreneurship is more likely to equip entrepreneurs with the necessary skills for business design and 
growth strategies and consequently, enable them to better exploit entrepreneurial opportunities in the 
market (Levie and Autio, 2008; Fuentelsaz et al., 2015). 
Literature suggested that educated workforce is an essential ingredient for higher rates of 
entrepreneurship in the context of emerging economies (Baumol et al., 2007; Aidis et al., 2008; Valliere 
and Peterson, 2011). However, educated entrepreneurs may not react similarly to opportunities in all 
contexts, but rather their reactions may be conditioned by the institutional environment especially in 
the context of emerging economies (Baumol et al., 2007; Autio and Acs, 2010; Danis and De Clercq, 
2011; Acs et al., 2014b). For example, Manolova et al. (2008) found that while some post-communist 
countries, such as Bulgaria, Hungary and Latvia have higher levels of education, these countries tend 
to exhibit lower rates of entrepreneurship due to entrepreneur’s lack of confidence and required skills 
to start new businesses. Apart from the fact that this low confidence could be explained through political 
and social transition (Manolova et al., 2008), literature suggested that improving education would be 
more effective on increasing entrepreneurial activity levels if it is accompanied by more control of 
corruption (Álvarez and Urbano, 2011; Aparico et al., 2016).  
In this realm, Aparicio et al. (2016) contended that control of corruption increases trust in the 
system and as such, will create a better alliance between government policies and educational system. 
Moreover, Álvarez and Urbano (2011) suggested that control of corruption could allow future 
entrepreneurs to gain a greater share of their generated revenue and therefore, propel higher levels of 
entrepreneurial activity. Also, control of corruption would allow an increase in the amount of budget 
allocated to the education infrastructure and research and development (R&D), which are extra 
variables to support entrepreneurial activity (Aparicio et al., 2016). Hence, controlling corruption could 
result in more opportunities for new venture creation (Aidis et al., 2008) based on technology and with 
higher added value (Aparicio et al., 2016). Therefore, in this study’s context, the primary challenge for 
emerging economies is to overcome the high levels of corruption in order to improve the tertiary 
education and entrepreneurial activity levels (Acs et al., 2014a; Castaño et al., 2015; Aparicio et al., 
2016). As a result, this study proposes the following hypothesis: 
 
H2: Control of corruption moderates the positive relationship between education and training 
and entrepreneurial activity such that the stronger the control of corruption, the stronger this 
relationship. 
 
2.4 Control of Corruption, Access to Credit and Entrepreneurship 
 
As we mentioned earlier, financial support availability is among the most important pillars for 
entrepreneurs to start and grow their ventures (Gnyawali and Foger, 1994). Van Auken and Neely 
(1999) underscored the inadequacy in financial structure poses major obstacle to venture creation, as 
with no access to credit, individuals are unable to materialise their ideas, and as a result, the 
entrepreneurial activity decreases. Although new businesses may depend on personal funds received 
from informal investors such as family and social networks (Szerb et al., 2007), financial resources such 
as venture capital and bank loans are integral for aspiring entrepreneurs who seek to expand their 
businesses either locally or in foreign markets (Bowen and De Clercq, 2008; Korosteleva and 
Mickiewicz, 2011; Stenhom et al., 2013; Fuentelsaz et al., 2015; Aparicio et al., 2016). In this regard, 
Beck et al. (2005) found that entrepreneurs who face financial constraints such as high-interest rates, 
collateral requirements and lack of money in the banking system or face the need for special bank 
connections are less likely to exhibit venture growth rates. Conversely, Beck et al. (2008) found that 
small firms that obtain formal financing have better performance on several metrics in comparison with 
similar firms that depend on informal financing. To this end, various studies have suggested policies to 
improve access to bank credit through lowering capital requirements; credit with low-interest rates, and 
credit guarantee schemes, to promote new venture creation (Gnyawali and Fogel, 1994; Álvarez and 
Urbano, 2011; Bowen and DeClercq, 2008; Castaño-Martínez et al., 2015; Fuentelsaz et al., 2015; 
Aparicio et al., 2016). 
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The extent to which the financial system supports entrepreneurial activity in terms of providing 
resources to start and grow the business varies substantially across countries (Levie and Autio, 2008; 
Korosteleva and Mickiewicz, 2011; Chowdhury et al., 2015). In the context of emerging economies, 
the availability of financial resources is limited due to the lack of development in the financial institution 
(Aidis et al., 2008; Acs and Correa, 2014). In this regard, prior research suggested that higher levels of 
corruption and bribery adversely impact the development of a country’s financial infrastructure (La 
Porta et al., 1999), and this uncertainty caused by corruption could generate distrust among 
entrepreneurs in the financial system, preventing its maturity (Aparicio et al., 2016). On the contrary, 
the prevalence of trust has been found to positively influence entrepreneurs to engage in high-growth 
business activities (Bowen and DeClercq, 2008). This suggests a potential interaction effect between a 
country’s level of corruption and financial development on the one hand, and the new firm start-ups 
rates within its borders on the other (Bowen and DeClercq, 2008; Chowdhury et al., 2015). 
Concerning the study’s context, Johnson et al. (2002) analysed entrepreneurship in post-
communist countries and found that extra-legal payments (bribes) hinder entrepreneurial activity more 
than the lack of financing. Therefore, corruption (as well as other deficiencies in the governance of a 
country) may increase transaction costs while limiting the income for entrepreneurs (Álvarez and 
Urbano, 2011). In turn, control of corruption may motivate increased entrepreneurial activity by 
allowing entrepreneurs to retain a greater share of their generated revenue (Álvarez and Urbano, 2011). 
As a result, we extend this argument by hypothesising that the presence of corruption free environment 
can leverage the financial system toward entrepreneurship (Korosteleva and Mickiewicz, 2011; 
Nofsinger and Wang, 2011; Aparicio et al., 2016). Thus: 
 
H3: Control of corruption moderates the positive relationship between access to bank credit and 
entrepreneurial activity such that the stronger the control of corruption, the stronger this 
relationship.  
 
2.5 Control of Corruption, Technology Absorption and Entrepreneurship 
 
The last formal institution analysed in this study is technology absorption (Gnyawali and Foger, 
1994). The diffusion of new technology, as well as the capacity for firms to absorb it, is an essential 
factor for innovation and high growth ventures (Stenholm et al., 2013; Acs et al., 2014b). In this realm, 
improvements in information and communication technology (ICT) via internet (e.g., cloud computing, 
social media, internet of things, mobile phone services and big data analytics) may motivate individuals 
to start new businesses due to potential for higher returns such as better exchange information, fewer 
expenses and less time consuming (Acs 2006; Acs et al., 2008a). Hence, public policies that allow faster 
access to information and internet may further lead to more entrepreneurial activity and more innovation 
in the context of post-communist countries (Acs and Szerb 2007; Audretsch and Belitski, 2016).  
However, as suggested by the literature, it is essential to remove barriers that hinder the 
development of technological infrastructure policies in the context of emerging economies (Acemoglu 
and Robinson, 2006; Pathak et al., 2015; Audretsch and Belitski, 2016). In particular, barriers, as 
mentioned earlier, may allude to the efforts by the political elite to block technological and institutional 
development in order to protect their benefits under the statuesque system (Acemoglu and Robinson, 
2006). Thus, corrupt nations are less likely to benefit from FDI investment by high tech companies that 
are reluctant to enter markets accompanied by higher potential costs of corruption (Anokhin and 
Schulze, 2009). As a result, control of corruption may facilitate the transformation of new knowledge 
into new products and technology that ultimately fosters innovation and higher rates of entrepreneurial 
activity (Audretsch et al., 2008; Pathak et al., 2015). Thus, this study proposes the following hypothesis: 
 
H4: Control of corruption moderates the positive relationship between technology absorption and 
entrepreneurial activity such that the stronger the control of corruption, the stronger this 
relationship. 
 




Our data sources represent a sample of post-communist countries which fit the characterisations 
of emerging economies as suggested by Hoskisson et al. (2000). In this context, emerging economies 
are described as low-income countries that go through encouraging private enterprise development and 
increased economic liberalisation (Hoskisson et al., 2000). While these countries shared common 
histories with respect to their pervasive corruption problems and inherited underdeveloped institutional 
legacies, differences in the pace and extent of economic liberalisation and institutional development 
provided the basis for our key research question (De Clercq et al., 2010; Kiss et al., 2012): Do formal 
institutions affect entrepreneurial activity levels in the same way under both conditions of endemic 
corruption and freedom from it? 
In addressing our research question, we analysed the moderating effect of an informal 
institution on the relationship between formal institutions and entrepreneurial activity in the context of 
post-communist countries. The variables analysed in this study included informal (control of 
corruption) and formal institutions (the number of procedures for starting a business, education and 
training, access to credit, and technology absorption by firms). The final sample consisted of 14 post-
communist countries using a panel of data for the period 2006–2016 in which data were available for 
all key variables (i.e., dependent and independent variables) of the study. 
 
Table 1: Description of variables 
 
Variable Description Source* 
Dependant variable New Entry Rate (NER) “The number of newly registered firms with 
limited liability per 1,000 working-age people 
(ages 15-64) per calendar year.” 




Control of corruption 
(CC) 
“Control of corruption (CC) – capturing 
perceptions of the extent to which public power 
is exercised for private gain, including both 
petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as 
“capture” of the state by elites and private 
interests. The values are between -2.5 and 2.5 
with higher scores corresponding to better 





Procedures for starting a 
business (PRO) 
“Natural logarithm of the product between the 
number of procedures that are officially 
required for an entrepreneur to start up and 
formally operate an industrial or commercial 
business and the duration of these procedures.” 
Doing Business 2006 to 2016 
 Tertiary education 
(TEDU) 
“Percentage of individuals who have business 
and entrepreneurial skills. It is obtained as the 
product of percentage of tertiary graduates in 
the population multiplied by percentage of 
tertiary graduates in social sciences, business 
and law.” 
UNESCO 2006 to 2016 
 Access to credit (AC) “Domestic credit indicator provided by the 
banking sector which includes all credit to 
various sectors.” 
World Bank 2006 to 2016 
 Firm-level technology 
absorption (TA) 
“To what extent do businesses in your country 
absorb new technology? [1 = not at all; 7 = 
aggressively absorb]” 
Global Competitiveness Report 
2006 to 2016 
Control variable GDP growth (GDPg) “Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at 
market prices based on constant local currency. 
Aggregates are based on constant 2010 U.S. 
dollars. GDP is the sum of gross value.” 
World Bank 2006 to 2016 
*Doing Business. http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploretopics/entrepreneurship; https://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/doing-business-database; 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FD.AST.PRVT.GD.ZS; The World Bank https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?view=chart; The 
World Bank https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FD.AST.PRVT.GD.ZS; UNESCO. http://data.un.org/Search.aspx?q=tertiary+education+enrollment; Global 
Competitiveness Index http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-report-2015-2016/downloads/; WGI Worldwide Governance Indicators. 
https://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/worldwide-governance-indicators.  
 
The data for this study is procured from different sources (see Table 1). The dependent variable 
related to the entrepreneurial activity (NER) was derived from the World Bank Entrepreneurship 
Snapshot dataset which tracks the new entry rate of registered firms with limited liability companies 
(LLCs) in government authorities (Acs et al., 2008b). This index is commonly used in the literature to 
compare entrepreneurial activity across countries (Acs et al., 2008b; Belitski et al., 2016; Dvouletý, 
2018). While this measure does not consider other forms of business activities (e.g., sole proprietorship, 
a partnership, a cooperative, a corporation, or a joint stock company), this study focused on the new 
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entry rate of registered firms since they constitute the most common type of business worldwide. This 
is particularly evident in the case of post-communist economies such as Latvia where LLCs account for 
62% of all registered business and 93% of output (Doing Business, 2004, 2018). Thus, this measure is 
useful in accounting for “productive” entrepreneurship as aspiring entrepreneurs tend to register their 
ventures in order to benefit from the potential advantages of participating in the formal economy 
(Baumol, 1990; Klapper et al., 2010; Levie and Autio, 2011; Ghura et al., 2017). Moreover, the World 
Bank Entrepreneurship dataset could be more conducive for this study to measure entrepreneurial 
activity than other measures such as the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) data or self-
employment. This is because it measures new formal firms that, rationally, would be more sensitive to 
institution barriers, such as complex regulations and corruption (Belitski et al., 2016; Ghura, 2019). 
The data about the informal institution, control of corruption (CC) as the independent variable, 
was obtained from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project. Control of corruption (CC) 
captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both 
petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by elites and private interests. The 
scores in this database lie between -2.5 and 2.5, with higher scores corresponding to better outcomes of 
the institutions (Álvarez and Urbano, 2011; Aparicio et al., 2016).  
Moreover, the source of data for the independent variables of formal institutions such as the 
number of procedures for starting a business (PRO) was taken from the World Bank’s Doing Business 
project which provides the number of procedures that are officially required for an entrepreneur to start 
up and formally operate an industrial or commercial business (Álvarez and Urbano, 2011; Aparicio et 
al., 2016). The second formal institution for the education and training variable (TEDU) was measured 
as the percentage of the population with tertiary education in the country, as obtained from the UNESCO 
database, indicating the percentage of the population with business and entrepreneurial skills (Álvarez 
and Urbano, 2011; Chowdhury et al., 2015). The third formal institution for access to credit (AC) was 
measured from the overall domestic credit to the private sector provided by banks as a share of GDP; it 
comes from the WDI dataset (Álvarez and Urbano, 2011). A final dimension of the formal institution 
is the availability of the latest technologies in a country (TA). This variable was measured from how 
favourable the environment is for the diffusion of technological change and was obtained from the 
Global Competitiveness Report (GCR) (Acs et al., 2008b; Stenholm et al., 2013). 
Finally, given that the level of economic development of countries is considered a critical factor 
in explaining entrepreneurial activity (Wennekers et al., 2005; Acs et al., 2014a), this study controlled 
the country’s annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices (GDPg). In line with other studies, 
this data source was obtained from the World Bank (Bowen and De Clercq, 2008; Levie and Autio, 
2011; Fuentelsaz et al., 2015). 
Table 1 presents a list of dependent and independent variables used in this study, including their 
sources. Our final sample consisted of a balanced panel with data on 154 observations and 14 countries 
(see Appendix1 for a list of post-communist countries with their mean values). 
As the study’s dataset deal with a relatively substantial number of cross-sectional units (14 
post-communist countries) that have various characterisations (e.g., cultural values, religions, social 
norms, and using different currencies), it is more likely to have heterogeneity in panel data (Wooldridge, 
2012). Therefore, this research applied the fixed effects (regression) model (FEM), which allows 
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity across countries that are fixed over time. 
Based on the previous argument, this study proposed the following two models given below for 
the hypothesis’s analyses; this indicated that a FEM provided a better fit for our data. However, this 
study takes into account that the FEM uses an only within-country variation, which impacts the 
interpretation of the results (Aidis et al., 2012). 
 
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
+𝛽𝛽6𝐺𝐺𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                          . . . . . . . . . . (1) 
 
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
+𝛽𝛽6(𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂 ∗ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽7(𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝑈𝑈 ∗ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽8(𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶 ∗ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 




In model 1, 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 are the vectors representing the formal institutions, 
while 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the vector representing the informal institution. 𝐺𝐺𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the controlling vector that 
influences entrepreneurial activity in country (i) at time (t) which refers to the economic growth rate.  
In model 2, (𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂 ∗ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, (𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝑈𝑈 ∗ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, (𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶 ∗ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  and (𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴 ∗ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  are the vectors 
representing the moderation effect of control of corruption between formal institutions and 
entrepreneurial activity.    
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Table 2 reports the means, standard deviations, and correlation coefficients of the variables 
used in this study. Our descriptive statistics showed that some variables might be highly correlated (e.g., 
control of corruption with education and training, credit and technology). Hence, to avoid the problem 
of multicollinearity, which could affect the significance of the main parameters in the regressions 
through Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) computations, we followed Aiken and West’s (1991) 
procedures to assess the interaction effects. In this approach, we formed interaction terms by 
multiplying the mean-centred values of the interacting variables, then include these terms in one 
regression equation. This approach was adopted in different studies to minimise the possibility of 
multicollinearity (De Clercq et al., 2010; Danis et al., 2011). As a result, the VIF scores are below the 
cut-off value of 5, and thus, multicollinearity is not a concern in the analysis (Mehmetoglu and 
Jakobsen, 2017).  
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
 
 Variable Post-communist countries 
  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 1. New Entry Rate (NER) 4.80 3.49 0.81 20.76 
Informal 2. Control of corruption (CC) 0.06 0.64 -1.31 1.30 
Formal 3. Procedures for starting a business (PRO) 5.89 2.06 2 11 
 4. Education and training (TEDU) 59.91 15.54 25.72 89.25 
 5. Access to credit (AC) 51.79 30.43 6.16 247.52 
 6. Firm-level technology absorption (TA) 4.53 0.56 3.11 5.50 
Control 7. GDP growth (GDPg) 2.33 5.34 -21.53 13.74 
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. NER 1       
2. CC 0.565*** 1      
3. PRO -0.256** -0.095 1     
4. TEDU 0.288*** 0.389*** 0.051 1    
5. AC 0.343*** 0.456*** 0.017 0.358*** 1   
6. TA 0.416*** 0.738*** 0.061 0.539*** 0.283*** 1  
7. GDPg 0.015 -0.107 0.188 -0.156 -0.224 -0.061 1 
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01 
 
Aiming to analyse and compare the role of the institutional environment’s effect on 
entrepreneurial activity, we created two different models. Model 1 included the direct effect of informal 
and formal factors for entrepreneurial activity, whereas Model 2 included the moderating effect of 
control of corruption on the relationship between formal institutions and entrepreneurial activity (see 
Table 3). 
In order to estimate all the regressions, we tried to develop a panel data analysis. As discussed 
earlier, this study assumes that FEM was more appropriate to estimate Model 1 and 2. This specification 
model enables us to study the impact of variables that vary over time (Wooldridge, 2012). Moreover, 
to address the possibility of heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation and cross-sectional dependence, we 
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followed Roman’s et al. (2018, p. 517) study and applied Driscoll and Kraay’s (1998) “standard errors 
for the coefficients estimated by the within-group regression, robust to heteroskedasticity and the very 
general forms of cross-sectional and temporal dependence”.  
In Table 3, the results of Model 1 showed that corruption played a significant role in post-
communist countries as it was significant at the 95% level and with the expected sign. Thus, living in a 
country where entrepreneurship has a high-level corruption-free environment often increases the 
probability of entrepreneurial activity (Anokhin and Schulze, 2009; Aidis et al., 2012; Avnimelech et 
al., 2014; Aparicio et al., 2016; Dutta and Sobel, 2016). However, formal factors results were 
inconsistent in Model 1. In this regard, the relationship between the number of procedures for starting 
a business and entrepreneurial activity was significant at (p < 0.05) with a negative sign. In contrast, 
the relationship between education and training and access to credit with entrepreneurial activity was 
not significant. Moreover, the relationship between the firm-level technology absorption with 
entrepreneurial activity was significant at the 95% level with a negative sign. These findings were 
contrary to previous studies which have suggested that education (Baumol et al., 2007; Aidis et al., 
2008; Valliere and Peterson, 2011), access to capital (Bowen and De Clercq, 2008; Aparicio et al., 
2016) and technology absorption (Gnyawali and Fogel, 1994; Stenholm et al., 2013; Acs et al., 2014b) 
are a critical success factor when developing new start-ups. This model explained 87% of the total 
variation of entrepreneurial activity. 
Table 3: Regression analysis explaining entrepreneurial activity (NER) 
 
 Model 1 
Coef. (std. error) 
Model 2 
Coef. (std. error) 
Informal institution   
   Control of corruption (CC) 3.916** (0.78) 3.860*** (0.55) 
Formal institutions   
   Procedures for starting a business (PRO) -0.142** (.04)  -0.156** (0.03) 
   Education and training (TEDU) 0.038 (0.01) 0.050* (0.02) 
   Access to credit (AC) -0.004 (0.00) 0.002 (0.00) 
   Firm-level technology absorption (TA) -1.163** (0.46) -0.878 (0.52) 
   H1: Control of corruption (CC) x Procedures for starting a business (PRO)  -0.394*** (0.05) 
   H2: Control of corruption (CC) x Education and training (TEDU)  0.096** (0.02) 
   H3: Control of corruption (CC) x Access to credit (AC)  -0.026 (0.01) 
   H4: Control of corruption (CC) x Firm-level technology absorption (TA)  -0.716 (0.61) 
Control variable   
   GDP growth (GDPg) 0.077** (0.02) 0.081** (0.021) 
   
Constant 8.455** (2.74) 4.470***(0.27) 
Prob.(F-statistic) 0.0012 0.0042 
R2 0.87 0.89 
Observations 154 154 
Countries 14 14 
Notes: Driscoll-Kraay standard errors between parentheses. 
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1 
The results of Model 2 (see Table 3) showed that the interaction effect of informal and formal 
institutions was related to the entrepreneurial activity. In this model, we included control of corruption 
as the moderating factor between the relationship of formal institutions and entrepreneurship. The 
results found that the moderating coefficients of the number of procedures in this model were highly 
significant at (p < 0.01), the moderating coefficient of education and training was significant at (p < 
0.05). Model 2 explains 89% of the total variation in entrepreneurial activity. 
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In comparison with Model 1, the results of Model 2 indicated that control of corruption has 
both a direct and indirect impact on entrepreneurial activity; thus, we confirmed the importance of the 
control of corruption to promoting entrepreneurial activity in post-communist countries as it behaved 
as a moderator as well (Pathak et al. 2015). Moreover, Model 2 showed a better framework than Model 
1, as R2 explained 89% of the total variation of entrepreneurial activity.  
Concerning the hypotheses testing, Hypothesis 1 suggested that the number of procedures for 
starting a business has a negative influence on entrepreneurship in each post-communist economy that 
has lower levels of corruption. While Model 1 showed that number of procedures has a negative and 
significant influence on entrepreneurial activity for each emerging economy (β = -0.142; p < 0.05), 
Model 2 showed that the interaction effect between number of procedures and corruption has a negative 
and significant influence on entrepreneurial activity for each emerging economy (β = -0.394; p < 0.01). 
The results showed that the interaction effect of control of corruption and the number of procedures 
coefficient is higher than the coefficient of the direct effect of the number of procedures in each post-
communist economy, supporting Hypothesis 1. Although the results of Model 1 were congruent with 
the literature (the more days required for the creation of a new firm, the less likely it is that the 
entrepreneurial activity will occur) (Álvarez and Urbano, 2011; Aparicio et al., 2016), the results of 
Model 2 showed that the number of procedures has a better impact on entrepreneurial activity in post-
communist economies that have lower levels of corruption as suggested by the literature (Naudé, 2008; 
Klapper and Love, 2010; Aparicio et al., 2016).  
Hypothesis 2 proposed that lower levels of corruption positively influence the relationship 
between education and training with entrepreneurial activity in each post-communist economy. While 
Model 1 showed that education and training were not significant to entrepreneurial activity, Model 2 
showed that the interaction effect between education and training with corruption has a positive and 
highly significant influence on entrepreneurial activity (β = 0.096; p < 0.05). The results for the 
moderating role of corruption were in line with our expectations, supporting Hypothesis 2. Therefore, 
an educational system with an entrepreneurial focus is more likely to increase entrepreneurial activity 
in emerging economies that have lower levels of corruption rather than higher levels of corruption as 
suggested by literature (Álvarez and Urbano, 2011; Aparicio et al., 2016). 
Hypotheses 3 suggested that access to credit from banks has a positive influence on 
entrepreneurial activity in the context of each post-communist economy that has lower levels of 
corruption. While Model 1 showed that access to credit was not significant to entrepreneurial activity, 
Model 2 also showed that the interaction effect between control of corruption and access to credit has 
no significant influence on entrepreneurial activity. The interpretation of the previous results could be 
explained in three ways. First, the previous results could suggest that entrepreneurs who are associated 
with higher risk levels tend to obtain financial resources from social networks and family connections; 
this may be because existing financial institutions are underdeveloped and less likely to support their 
new ventures (Ho and Wong, 2007; Chowdhury et al., 2015b; Fuentelsaz et al., 2015; Ghura et al., 
2017). Second, another interpretation for the findings was suggested by Wennekers et al. (2005), who 
argued that emerging economies have higher rates of necessity entrepreneurship (i.e., informal 
entrepreneurship), which does not require large amounts of credit. Lastly, although this latter idea could 
be right, the results also suggested that entrepreneurs may later depend on alternative sources to fund 
their growing businesses, such as venture capital funds, angel investors and corporate investors, due to 
the lack of adequate financial infrastructure (Bowen and De Clercq, 2008; Aidis, 2012; Ghura et al., 
2017). 
Finally, Hypotheses 4 suggested that firm-level technology absorption has a significant 
influence on entrepreneurship in each post-communist economy that has lower levels of corruption. The 
results were contrary to the study’s expectations as the coefficient regression was significant with a 
negative sign (β = -1.163; p < 0.05) in Model 1 and not significant in Model 2. Although not what we 
predicted, the previous results could suggest that new business activities in post-communist economies 
that have lower levels of corruption are still not technology-based and characterised by imitative 
entrepreneurship. In this regard, entrepreneurs in post-communist countries tend to copy technologies 
from developed economies to expand their economy of scale (Acs, 2006; Minniti and Lévesque, 2010). 
Entrepreneurs are, therefore, less likely to invest in R&D, even though imitative entrepreneurship is 
significant to economic growth. This is especially true in the case of emerging economies, as they 
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increase competition and product availability when the revenues to R&D expenditure are low (Minniti 
and Levesque, 2010). 
In general, the estimated coefficient of the control variable of economic growth was consistent 
with the existing literature (Models 1 and 2), which indicated a positive and significant influence 
between economic growth and entrepreneurial activity (Levie and Autio, 2011; Fuentelsaz et al., 2015). 
To this end, the inconsistency of findings between model 1 and model 2 provided some support 
for the conceptual premise that it is essential to consider the interactions of formal and informal 
institutions and their impact on entrepreneurial activity (North 1990, 2005, Williamson, 2000; Acs et 
al., 2014a; Ghura et al., 2017). These results were in line with previous literature that suggested that 
certain institutional variables such as control of corruption can be conducive for entrepreneurial activity 
levels in the context of post-communist emerging economies (Aidis et al., 2008; Tonoyan et al., 2010; 




Considering that entrepreneurship is a key driver for economic growth and development (Acs 
et al., 2014a, b; Aparicio et al., 2016; Ghura et al., 2017), understanding which institutional variables 
contribute to fostering and enhancing entrepreneurship appears to be a remarkable phenomenon (Levie 
and Autio, 2011; Stenholm et al., 2013; Fuentelsaz et al., 2018; Urbano et al., 2018). In this thesis, 
balanced longitudinal panel data (for the period 2006-2016) were used to empirically examine the 
simultaneous effect of institutional variables on the development of entrepreneurial activity in the 
context of 14 post-communist economies. By developing a conceptual framework of institutional 
economics, this study analysed the interaction effect of informal (i.e., corruption) and formal institutions 
(i.e., the number of procedures involved in starting a business and education and training, access to 
credit, and technology absorption) on the rates of entrepreneurial activity.  
The main findings shed more light on the importance of the environmental factors on 
entrepreneurship (Álvarez and Urbano, 2011; Aparicio et al., 2016). Overall, control of corruption 
showed that it behaves as a moderator between formal institutions and entrepreneurship. In particular, 
the evidence from this study showed that formal institutions, such as the number of procedures, and 
education and training, are more likely to encourage individual’s choice to become an entrepreneur and 
start a new business activity in post-communist economies that have a perception of lower levels of 
corruption. Therefore, it is inappropriate for policymakers in post-communist countries to rely on the 
reform changes of the formal institutions without considering the reforms of the informal institutions, 
such as corruption (Dvouletý and Blažková, 2018). 
The study has several contributions. First, it advanced the existing theory in the field of 
entrepreneurship and Institutional Economics as few empirical papers are grounded in both theories 
(Acs et al., 2014a, b). Second, we developed a theoretical model that explains factors that may influence 
the likelihood of individuals entering entrepreneurship. This study was among the first testing the 
moderating effect of control of corruption on formal institutions predicting entrepreneurial activity. 
Third, our findings have implications for policymakers who are interested in fostering and promoting 
entrepreneurship for the benefit of economic and productivity growth in the context of emerging 
economies.  
The generalizability of the study’s findings is subject to certain limitations that could become 
future research lines. First, more accurate measures for both dependent and independent variables could 
be used. On the one hand, our study has considered only one particular aspect of high-growth 
entrepreneurship, which is newly registered firms with limited liability. Although newly registered 
firms are recognised as one of the critical drivers that entrepreneurial activity may make to economic 
growth (Acs et al., 2008b; Levie and Autio, 2011), future research should seek to examine other aspects 
of growth-oriented entrepreneurship such as activities involving a high level of innovation, corporate 
entrepreneurship or technology developments (Bowen and De Clercq, 2008; Turro et al., 2014). On the 
other hand, using other (or more) environmental variables (e.g., national culture) is crucial to 
understanding entrepreneurship in emerging countries where institutional arrangements can vary 
significantly from those in developed countries (Bruton et al., 2008; Hayton and Cacciotti, 2013; 
Fernández-Serrano and Liñán, 2014; Fernández-Serrano and Romero, 2014; Sambharya and Musteen, 
2014; Brancu et al., 2015). Second, the examined models to explain entrepreneurial activity through 
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institutions are quite adequate and robust, but it is necessary to complement them and consider emerging 
economies at different levels of economic development (Stenholm et al., 2013; Acs et al., 2014a). Third, 
it is recommended that further research is undertaken in larger samples across more countries or in 
different regions such as resource-based economies, African or Asian contexts in which corruption is 
prevalent in many of those nations (Pathak et al., 2015). We hope that our study will inspire further 






Acemoglu, D., and Robinson, J. A. (2006), “Economic backwardness in political perspective”, 
American Political Science Review”, Vol. 100 No 1, pp. 115-131. 
Acs, Z. (2006), “How is entrepreneurship good for economic growth?”, Innovations, Vol. 1 No. 1, pp. 
97-107. 
Acs, Z. J., and Correa, P. G. (2014), “Identifying the obstacles to high-Impact entrepreneurship in 
Latin America and the Caribbean”, The World Bank, pp. 1-32. 
Acs, Z.J., Desai, S. and Hessels, J. (2008a), “Entrepreneurship, economic development and 
institutions”, Small Business Economics, Vol. 31 No. 3, pp. 219-234. 
Acs, Z. J., Desai, S., and Klapper, L. F. (2008b), “What does “entrepreneurship” data really 
show?”, Small Business Economics, Vol. 31 No 3, pp. 265-281. 
Acs, Z. J., and Szerb, L. (2007), “Entrepreneurship, economic growth and public policy”, Small 
business economics, Vol. 28 No. 2-3, pp. 109-122. 
Acs, Z.J. and Szerb, L. (2010), “Global Entrepreneurship and the United States”, Small Business 
 Administration, Washington, DC. 
Acs, Z.J., Autio, E. and Szerb, L. (2014a), “National systems of entrepreneurship: measurement issues 
 and policy implications”, Research Policy, Vol. 43 No. 3, pp. 476-494. 
Acs, Z.J., Szerb, L. and Autio, E. (2014b), “The global entrepreneurship and development index”, 
 in Lloyd, A. (Ed.), Global Entrepreneurship and Development Index 2014, The Global 
Entrepreneurship and Development Institute, Washington, DC, pp. 1-120. 
Ahlstrom, D., Bruton, G. D., and Yeh, K. S. (2008), “Private firms in China: Building legitimacy in 
an emerging economy”, Journal of world business, Vol. 43 No 4, pp. 385-399. 
Aidis, R., Estrin, S., and Mickiewicz, T. (2008), “Institutions and entrepreneurship development in 
Russia: A comparative perspective”, Journal of Business Venturing, Vol. 23 No. 6, pp. 656-
672. 
Aidis, R., Estrin, S. and Mickiewicz, T.M. (2012), “Size matters: entrepreneurial entry and 
government”, Small Business Economics, Vol. 39 No. 1, pp. 119-139. 
Aidt, T. S. (2009), “Corruption, institutions, and economic development” Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy, Vol. 25 No. 2, pp. 271-291. 
Aiken, L.S. and West, S.G. (1991), “Multiple regression: Testing and interpreting interactions”, Sage, 
Newbury Park, CA. 
Álvarez, C. and Urbano, D. (2011), “Environmental factors and entrepreneurial activity in Latin 
America”, Academia. Revista Latinoamericana de Administración, No. 48, pp. 31-45, 
available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1974138 
Álvarez, C., Urbano, D. and Amorós, J.E. (2014), “GEM research: achievements and challenges”, 
Small Business Economics, Vol. 42 No. 3, pp. 445-465. 
Anokhin, S. and Schulze, W.S. (2009), “Entrepreneurship, innovation, and corruption”, Journal of 
Business Venturing, Vol. 24 No. 5, pp. 465-476. 
Aparicio, S., Urbano, D. and Audretsch, D. (2016), “Institutional factors, opportunity 
entrepreneurship and economic growth: panel data evidence”, Technological Forecasting and 
Social Change, Vol. 102 No. C, pp. 45-61. 
Audretsch, D. B., Bönte, W., & Keilbach, M. (2008), “Entrepreneurship capital and its impact on 
knowledge diffusion and economic performance”, Journal of business venturing, Vol. 23 No. 
6, pp. 687-698. 
14 
 
Audretsch, D. B., and Belitski, M. (2016), “Entrepreneurial ecosystems in cities: establishing the 
framework conditions”, The Journal of Technology Transfer, Vol. 42 No.5, pp. 1030-1051. 
Autio, E., and Acs, Z. (2010), “Intellectual property protection and the formation of entrepreneurial 
growth aspirations” Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal, Vol. 4 No. 3, pp. 234-251. 
Avnimelech, G., Zelekha, Y., and Sharabi, E. (2014), “The effect of corruption on entrepreneurship in 
developed vs non-developed countries”, International Journal of Entrepreneurial Behaviour & 
Research, Vol. 20 No. 3, pp. 237-262. 
Baumol, W.J. (1990), “Entrepreneurship: productive, unproductive, and destructive”, Journal of 
Political Economy, Vol. 98 No. 5, pp. 893-921. 
Baumol, W.J., Litan, R.E. and Schramm, C.J. (2007), Good Capitalism, Bad Capitalism, and the 
Economics of Growth and Prosperity, Yale University Press, New Haven. 
Beck, T., Demirgüç-Kunt, A.S.L.I. and Maksimovic, V. (2005), “Financial and legal constraints to 
growth: does firm size matter?”, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 60 No. 1, pp. 137-177. 
Beck, T., Demirgüç-Kunt, A. and Maksimovic, V. (2008), “Financing patterns around the world: are 
small firms different?”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 89 No. 3, pp. 467-487. 
Belitski, M., Chowdhury, F. and Desai, S. (2016), “Taxes, corruption, and entry”, Small Business 
Economics, 47(1), 201-216. 
Bjørnskov, C., and Foss, N. J. (2016). “Institutions, Entrepreneurship, and Economic Growth: What 
Do We Know and What Do We Still Need to Know?”, The Academy of Management 
Perspectives, Vol. 30 No. 3, pp. 292-315. 
Bowen, H.P. and De Clercq, D. (2008), “Institutional context and the allocation of entrepreneurial 
effort”, Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 39 No. 4, pp. 747-767. 
Brancu, L., Guðmundsdóttir, S., Gligor, D., and Munteanu, V. (2015), “Is Culture a Moderator of 
Entrepreneurship Motivation? A Comparative Study of Romania and Iceland” Amfiteatru 
Economic, Vol. 17 No. 38, pp. 133-147. 
Bruton, G.D., Ahlstrom, D. and Obloj, K. (2008), “Entrepreneurship in emerging economies: where 
 are we today and where should the research go in the future”, Entrepreneurship Theory and 
Practice, Vol. 32 No. 1, pp. 1-14. 
Bruton, G. D., Ahlstrom, D., and Puky, T. (2009), “Institutional differences and the development of 
entrepreneurial ventures: A comparison of the venture capital industries in Latin America and 
Asia”, Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 40 No. 5, pp. 762-778. 
Bruton, G. D., Filatotchev, I., Si, S., and Wright, M. (2013), “Entrepreneurship and strategy in 
emerging economies”, Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal, Vol. 7 No. 3, pp. 169-180. 
Carlos Díaz Casero, J., Almodóvar González, M., de la Cruz Sánchez Escobedo, M., Coduras 
Martinez, A. and Hernández Mogollón, R. (2013), “Institutional variables, entrepreneurial 
activity and economic development”, Management Decision, Vol. 51 No. 2, pp. 281-305. 
Castaño, M.S., Méndez, M.T. and Galindo, M.Á. (2015), “The effect of social, cultural, and economic 
factors on entrepreneurship”, Journal of Business Research, Vol. 68 No. 7, pp. 1496-1500. 
Castaño-Martínez, M.S., Méndez-Picazo, M.T. and Galindo-Martín, M.Á. (2015), “Policies to 
promote entrepreneurial activity and economic performance”, Management Decision, Vol. 53 
No. 9, pp. 2073-2087. 
Chowdhury, F., Terjesen, S. and Audretsch, D. (2015), “Varieties of entrepreneurship: institutional 
drivers across entrepreneurial activity and country”, European Journal of Law and 
Economics, Vol. 40 No. 1, pp. 121-148. 
Danis, W. M., De Clercq, D., and Petricevic, O. (2011), “Are social networks more important for new 
business activity in emerging than developed economies? An empirical extension”, 
International Business Review, Vol. 20 No. 4, pp. 394-408. 
De Clercq, D., Danis, W.M. and Dakhli, M. (2010), “The moderating effect of institutional context on 
the relationship between associational activity and new business activity in emerging 
economies”, International Business Review, Vol. 19 No. 1, pp. 85-101. 
Doing business (2004), Understanding regulations, The World Bank, Washington DC. 
Doing business (2018), Reforming to create jobs, The World Bank, Washington DC. 
15 
 
Dreher, A., and Gassebner, M. (2013), “Greasing the wheels? The impact of regulations and 
corruption on firm entry”, Public Choice, Vol. 155 No. 3, pp. 413-432. 
Driscoll, J.C. and Kraay, A.C. (1998), Consistent covariance matrix estimation with spatially 
dependent panel data, Review of economics and statistics, 80(4), 549-560. 
Dutta, N., and Sobel, R. (2016), “Does corruption ever help entrepreneurship?” Small Business 
Economics, Vol. 47 No. 1, pp. 179-199. 
Dvouletý, O. (2017), “Determinants of Nordic entrepreneurship”, Journal of Small Business and 
Enterprise Development, Vol. 24 No. 1, pp. 12-33. 
Dvouletý, O., and Blažková, I. (2018), “Entrepreneurship and Corruption: Do Corruption Perceptions 
Influence Regional Entrepreneurial Activity?”, The 12th International Days of Statistics and 
Economics, pp. 433-440. 
Dvouletý, O. (2018), “How to analyse determinants of entrepreneurship and self-employment at the 
country level? A methodological contribution”, Journal of Business Venturing Insights, Vol. 
9, pp. 92-99. 
El Harbi, S. and Anderson, A.R. (2010), “Institutions and the shaping of different forms of 
entrepreneurship”, The Journal of Socio-Economics, Vol. 39 No. 3, pp. 436-444. 
Estrin, S., Korosteleva, J. and Mickiewicz, T. (2013), “Which institutions encourage entrepreneurial 
growth aspirations?”, Journal of Business Venturing, Vol. 28 No. 4, pp. 564-580. 
Feige, E. L. (1997). “Underground activity and institutional change: Productive, protective and 
predatory behaviour in transition economies”, Transforming post-communist political 
economies, pp. 21-34. National Academy Press, Washington, D.C. 
Fernández-Serrano, J., and Liñán, F. (2014), “Culture and entrepreneurship: The case of Latin 
America”, Innovar, Vol. 24(SPE), 169-180. 
Fernández-Serrano, J. and Romero, I. (2014), “About the interactive influence of culture and 
regulatory barriers on entrepreneurial activity”, International Entrepreneurship and 
Management Journal, Vol. 10 No. 4, pp. 781-802. 
Fuentelsaz, L., González, C., Maícas, J.P. and Montero, J. (2015), “How different formal institutions 
affect opportunity and necessity entrepreneurship”, BRQ Business Research Quarterly, Vol. 
18 No. 4, pp. 246-258. 
Ghura, H., Li, X., and Harraf, A. (2017), “Moderating relationship of institutions for opportunity 
entrepreneurship and economic development: Literature review and proposed conceptual 
framework”, World Journal of Entrepreneurship, Management and Sustainable 
Development, Vol. 13 No 4, pp. 350-374. 
Ghura, H., (2019), The interaction effect of formal and informal institutions on the development of 
entrepreneurial activity: A panel data analysis for emerging economies, PhD thesis submitted 
to Brunel University London, pp. 1- 211. 
Gnyawali, D.R. and Fogel, D.S. (1994), “Environments for entrepreneurship development: key 
dimensions and research implications”, Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, Vol. 18 No. 4, 
p. 43. 
Hayton, J.C. and Cacciotti, G. (2013), “Is there an entrepreneurial culture? A review of empirical 
research”, Entrepreneurship & Regional Development, Vol. 25 Nos 9-10, pp. 708-731. 
Ho, Y.P. and Wong, P.K. (2007), Financing, regulatory costs and entrepreneurial propensity, Small 
Business Economics, Vol. 28 No. (2-3), pp. 187-204. 
Hoskisson, R. E., Eden, L., Lau, C. M., and Wright, M. (2000), “Strategy in emerging 
economies”, Academy of management journal, Vol. 43 No. 3, pp. 249-267. 
Jiménez, A., Palmero-Cámara, C., González-Santos, M.J., Gonzalez-Bernal, J. and Jiménez 
Eguizábal, J.A. (2015), “The impact of educational levels on formal and informal 
entrepreneurship”, BRQ Business Research Quarterly, Vol. 18 No. 3, pp. 204-212. 
Johnson, S., McMillan, J., & Woodruff, C. (2002), “Property rights and finance”, American Economic 
Review, Vol. 92 No.5, pp. 1335-1356. 
Klapper, L., Laeven, L., and Rajan, R. (2006), “Entry regulation as a barrier to entrepreneurship”, 
Journal of financial economics, Vol. 82 No. 3, pp. 591-629. 
Klapper, L., Amit, R. and Guillén, M.F. (2010), “Entrepreneurship and firm formation across 
countries”, in Lerner, J. and Schoar, A. (Eds), International Differences in Entrepreneurship, 
16 
 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, pp. 129-158, available at: 
http://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/I/bo8648214.html 
Klapper, L., and Love, I. (2010), “The impact of business environment reforms on new firm 
registration”, The World Bank, No. 5493, pp. 1-50.  
Kiss, A. N., Danis, W. M., and Cavusgil, S. T. (2012), “International entrepreneurship research in 
emerging economies: A critical review and research agenda”. Journal of Business 
Venturing, Vol. 27 No. 2, pp. 266-290. 
Korosteleva, J., and Mickiewicz, T. (2011), “Start-up financing in the age of globalization”, Emerging 
Markets Finance and Trade, Vol. 47 No. 3, pp. 23-49. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., and Shleifer, A. (1999), “Corporate ownership around the world”, 
Journal of Finance, Vol. 54 No.2, pp. 471-517 
Levie, J. and Autio, E. (2008), “A theoretical grounding and test of the GEM model”, Small Business 
Economics, Vol. 31 No. 3, pp. 235-263. 
Levie, J. and Autio, E. (2011), “Regulatory burden, rule of law, and entry of strategic entrepreneurs: 
an international panel study”, Journal of Management Studies, Vol. 48 No. 6, pp. 1392-1419. 
Liu, J., Hu, M., Zhang, H., and Carrick, J. (2019), “Corruption and Entrepreneurship in Emerging 
Markets”, Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, Vol. 55 No. 5, pp. 1051-1068. 
Manolova, T.S., Eunni, R.V. and Gyoshev, B.S. (2008), “Institutional environments for 
entrepreneurship: evidence from emerging economies in Eastern Europe”, Entrepreneurship 
Theory and Practice, Vol. 32 No. 1, pp. 203-218. 
Minniti, M. and Lévesque, M. (2010), “Entrepreneurial types and economic growth”, Journal of 
Business Venturing, Vol. 25 No. 3, pp. 305-314. 
Mehmetoglu, M. and Jakobsen, T.G. (2017), “Applied statistics using Stata: a guide for the social 
sciences”, Sage, London. 
Mohamadi, A., Peltonen, J., and Wincent, J. (2017), “Government efficiency and corruption: A 
country-level study with implications for entrepreneurship”, Journal of Business Venturing 
Insights, Vol. 8, pp. 50-55. 
Naudé, W. (2008), “Entrepreneurship in economic development”, World Institute for Development 
Economics Research, Research Paper 2008/20. 
Nofsinger, J. R., and Wang, W. (2011), “Determinants of start-up firm external financing 
worldwide” Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 35 No.9, pp. 2282-2294. 
North, D.C. (1990), Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge 
University Press, New York, NY. 
North, D.C. (2005), Understanding the Process of Institutional Change, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, NJ. 
Pathak, S., Xavier-Oliveira, E., and Laplume, A. O. (2015), “Entrepreneurship in transition 
economies: The role of corruption and individual attributes”, Journal of Balkan and Near 
Eastern Studies, Vol. 17 No. 4, pp. 427-446. 
Payne, G.T., Moore, C.B., Bell, R.G. and Zachary, M.A. (2013), “Signaling organizational virtue: an 
examination of virtue rhetoric, country-level corruption, and performance of foreign IPOs 
from emerging and developed economies”, Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal, Vol. 7 No. 3, 
pp. 230-251. 
Roman, A., Bilan, I. and Ciumaș, C. (2018), “What drives the creation of new businesses? A panel-
data analysis for EU countries”, Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, 54(3), 508-536. 
Sambharya, R. and Musteen, M. (2014), “Institutional environment and entrepreneurship: an 
empirical study across countries”, Journal of International Entrepreneurship, Vol. 12 No. 4, 
pp. 314-330. 
Stenholm, P., Acs, Z.J. and Wuebker, R. (2013), “Exploring country-level institutional arrangements 
on the rate and type of entrepreneurial activity”, Journal of Business Venturing, Vol. 28 No. 
1, pp. 176-193. 
Smallbone, D., and Welter, F. (2001), “The distinctiveness of entrepreneurship in transition 
economies”, Small business economics, Vol. 16 No. 4, pp. 249-262. 
Smallbone, D., Welter, F., and Ateljevic, J. (2014), “Entrepreneurship in emerging market economies: 




Spence, M. (1973), “Job market signaling”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 87, pp. 355–74. 
Spence, M. A. (1974), “Market Signaling: Informational Transfer in Hiring and Related Screening 
Processes”, Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business Press. 
Szerb, L., Rappai, G., Makra, Z., and Terjesen, S. (2007), “Informal investment in transition 
economies: Individual characteristics and clusters”, Small Business Economics, Vol. 28 No. 
2, pp. 257-271. 
Tanzi, V. (1998), “Corruption around the world: causes, consequences, scope, and cures”, Staff 
Papers, Vol. 45 No. 4, pp. 559-594. 
Tonoyan, V., Strohmeyer, R., Habib, M., and Perlitz, M. (2010), “Corruption and entrepreneurship: 
How formal and informal institutions shape small firm behaviour in transition and mature 
market economies”, Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, Vol. 34 No. 5, pp. 803-831. 
Turró, A., Urbano, D., & Peris-Ortiz, M. (2014), “Culture and innovation: The moderating effect of 
cultural values on corporate entrepreneurship”, Technological Forecasting and Social 
Change, Vol. 88, pp. 360-369. 
Urbano, D. and Alvarez, C. (2014), “Institutional dimensions and entrepreneurial activity: an 
international study”, Small Business Economics, Vol. 42 No. 4, pp. 703-716. 
Urbano, D., Aparicio, S. and Audretsch, D. (2018), “Twenty-five years of research on institutions, 
entrepreneurship, and economic growth: what has been learned?”, Small Business Economics, 
1-29, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11187-018-0038-0. 
Valliere, D. and Peterson, R. (2009), “Entrepreneurship and economic growth: evidence from 
emerging and developed countries”, Entrepreneurship & Regional Development, Vol. 21 Nos 
5-6, pp. 459-480. 
Van Auken, H.E., Neely, L. (1999), “Obstacles to business launch”, Journal of development 
Entrepreneurship, Vol. 4 No. 2, pp. 175-187. 
Wennekers, S., Van Wennekers, A., Thurik, R. and Reynolds, P. (2005), “Nascent entrepreneurship 
and the level of economic development”, Small Business Economics, Vol. 24 No. 3, pp. 293-
309. 
Williamson, O.E. (2000), “The new institutional economics: taking stock, looking ahead”, Journal of 
 Economic Literature, Vol. 38 No. 3, pp. 595-613. 
Wooldridge, J.M. (2012), “Introductory econometrics: A modern approach”. South Western, Cengage 
learning, USA. 
 
Appendix 1: Mean values for Post-Communist Countries 
Country 2006-2014 NER CC PRO TEDU AC TA GDPg 
1. Armenia 1.46 -0.62 5.36 48.35 23.17 4.25 3.80 
2. Croatia 3.62 0.09 8.09 57.24 97.60 4.43 0.31 
3. Czech Republic 3.10 0.36 8.64 61.59 47.23 5.18 1.38 
4. Estonia 14.35 1.11 4.64 70.00 79.66 5.42 1.75 
5. Georgia 4.59 0.26 4.00 36.19 26.82 4.02 4.96 
6. Hungary 4.80 0.37 5.82 60.06 61.42 4.71 1.09 
7. Kyrgyz Republic 1.01 -1.20 5.18 44.73 18.42 3.62 3.84 
8. Latvia  8.81 0.33 4.45 71.96 62.60 4.63 1.31 
9. Lithuania 3.30 0.37 6.00 79.56 40.44 5.11 3.00 
10. Macedonia 4.66 -0.17 5.00 30.50 34.32 3.86 0.44 
11. Romania 4.93 -0.16 6.18 55.52 42.25 4.32 2.69 
12. Russian Federation 4.48 -1.01 6.79 69.92 40.55 4.10 3.38 
13. Slovak Republic 4.24 0.25 6.73 52.70 35.75 5.02 3.00 
14. Slovenia 3.90 0.90 5.64 84.17 67.85 4.80 1.17 
 “The number of newly registered firms with limited liability per 1,000 working-age people (ages 15-64) per calendar year.” 
 “Capturing perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, 
as well as “capture” of the state by elites and private interests. The values are between -2.5 and 2.5 with higher scores corresponding to better 
outcomes of institutions.” 
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 “Natural logarithm of the product between the number of procedures that are officially required for an entrepreneur to start up and formally 
operate an industrial or commercial business and the duration of these procedures.” 
 “Percentage of individuals who have business and entrepreneurial skills. It is obtained as the product of percentage of tertiary graduates in 
the population multiplied by percentage of tertiary graduates in social sciences, business and law.” 
 “Domestic credit indicator provided by the banking sector which includes all credit to various sectors.” 
 “To what extent do businesses in your country absorb new technology? [1 = not at all; 7 = aggressively absorb].” 
 “Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2010 U.S. 
dollars. GDP is the sum of gross value.” 
 
